Analogous to the well-documented firm size-wage differential there also exists a differential in layoff risk according to firm size. Using Austrian data I discuss several reasons for this puzzle, including on-the-job training and workers' heterogeneity. If less stable (and also less able) workers select themselves into small, unstable and low paying firms, predicted layoff risk of workers can be used as a proxy for heterogeneity of workers and therefore be included in wage regressions. Doing this, one-third of the size earnings premium can be explained.
Introduction
Large employers pay more. Numerous empirical studies have documented this relationship, 1 but they have not been able to explain it. In a very careful study Brown and Medoff (1989) look at ten possible reasons for this puzzle, only to conclude: "Our bottom line is that the size-wage differential appears to be both sizable and omnipresent; our analysis leaves us uncomfortably unable to explain it, or at least the part of it that is not explained by observable indicators of labor quality." (p. 1056). Neither compensating differentials for working conditions, nor product market power or the threat of unionization were able to explain the size premium. Brown and Medoff (1989) also found size effects for piece-rate workers, for unionized workers 2 and in longitudinal samples 3 where they controlled by first-differencing for unobserved heterogeneity of the individuals.
Given this wide interest in the effects of employer size on earnings, very little research has been done concerning size differentials in turnover. Are the jobs in big firms not only higher paid but also more stable? This would reinforce the puzzle of firm size once more. Anderson and Meyer (1994) look at separation rates without distinguishing between quit and layoff and find highly decreasing turnover rates with firm size for permanent separations but no size effect on temporary separations. 4 Brown and Medoff (1989) , as well as others, find quit rates to decline with firm size which speaks against compensating wage differentials arguments. The only study I know of concerning layoffs is Idson (1995) . He looks at the issue of long-term employment relationships in large establishments which may be possible due to the greater capacity of large employers to provide job mobility within the enterprise and the lower probability of business failure facing larger firms.
The aim of this study is to provide further evidence for a size-layoff relationship using Austrian data. I try to consider several explanations for this regularity, especially on-the-job training and the hypothesis of selective recruitment of workers into large and small firms. Following one hypothesis, small employers attract less stable and capable employees, a pattern which would cause only a spurious size-layoff relationship. On the other hand, if workers with a relatively 1 See e.g. Gerlach and Schmidt (1990) or Schmidt and Zimmermann (1991) for Germany. 2 See also Freeman and Medoff (1984) and Green, Machin and Manning (1992) for a discussion of union effects. 3 Evans and Leighton (1989) report similar fixed effects estimators, but come out with a disappearing size-wage differential. They use only categorical size indicators, which may produce unnecessary noise in the data by first differencing. 4 See also Wagner (1994) for German evidence on firm size and the prevalence of long-lasting jobs. low stock of human capital sort themselves into relatively inefficient firms with unstable employment prospects, then the size-wage effect itself may be upward biased. (Mayo and Murray, 1991) . The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents institutional details on wage bargaining and employment protection legislation in Austria. The data for the empirical study are discussed in Section 3. Results for size-wage and size-layoff relationships are presented in Section 4. Section 5 looks at the interaction between firm size, layoff risk and wage determination. Section 6 concludes.
Wage bargaining institutions and job security legislation in Austria
Wage bargaining in Austria is very centralized. Even though only about 60% of workers are organized in unions, bargaining outcomes are extended to all workers, unionized or not. A works council has to be established under the Austrian labor law in all establishments employing at least five adult workers, but usually the actual existence of a works council is positively determined by both firm size and firm age. In the private sector only 11 main unions operate, which are themselves coordinated by the Austrian Trade Union Federation. In yearly 'wage rounds' metal workers usually bargain first and set the path for the remaining unions which are highly influenced by the metal workers' outcome. This structure also guarantees proper consideration of competitiveness issues in foreign markets as the metal industry is very export-oriented.
As there is a substantial amount of wage drift between binding industry-specific minimum wages and actual wages paid 5 , unions bargain regularly over increases in minimum and actual wages. 6 For solidarity reasons minimum wages are usually raised by a higher amount. Furthermore, in rare cases wage compression was fostered by agreeing upon equal nominal raises for all income groups. (12% of agreements 1985 , Tomandl et al. 1992 . As a consequence, Austrian inter-industry wage differentials are a bit higher than in the Nordic countries, but much lower than in the US (Winter-Ebmer, 1994 , Barth, Zweimüller, 1992 .
Concerning job security provisions, Austria is among the most highly regulated countries (Emerson, 1988) . The rules of individual layoff distinguish between cases involving criminal acts and gross misconduct on the one hand, and cases based on economic conditions like redundancy and the professional suitability of 5 Guger (1989) estimates an average wage drift of 27% for 1987. 6 45% of all bargaining agreements between 1985 and 1990 contained binding regulations for actual wages (Tomandl et al. 1992 ) which could only be changed by further allowances at the shop floor. the employee on the other hand. The former category generally allows summary dismissal without compensation. The latter category involves statutory procedures which have to be followed. The Protection Against Dismissal Law applies to all firms with at least 5 employees and requires the approval of the works council in the case of a layoff .
Specially protected individuals consist of shop stewards, handicapped and women on maternity leave. In practice, the co-operation of works-councils in redundancy cases enhances the group of specially protected individuals to elderly persons and those more tenured, who might otherwise protest against the dismissal owing to 'social hardship clauses'. Wrongful termination lawsuits are seldom and mostly result not in reinstatement but in the payment of a financial compensation. General severance pay in the case of layoff has also recently been introduced for blue-collar workers and is determined by the length of service.
Rules for collective redundancies require 30 days of prenotification to the employment office. In general, this obligation exists for a layoff of more than 5% of the workforce, but is more compelling for larger firms; i.e. for firms with more than 1000 workers, any redundancy concerning more than 50 persons has to be notified. Mass dismissals have increasingly been accompanied by a social plan agreed between management, unions and sometimes the government. For firms with more than 200 employees, a special arbitration body has been established for the case of disagreement of management and works council. To sum up, the regulation of redundancies is, for different reasons, more severe for larger firms.
Data
To analyze the impact of firm size on earnings and displacement risk I use a representative sample drawn from Austrian social security records in May 1991. These data give information on the employment careers (from 1972 onwards) of 25,459 male non-agricultural and non-governmental workers. As the data have been collected for social security purposes only, several drawbacks exist. I can observe only monthly earnings up to an upper censoring because of the contribution assessment ceiling which amounted to ATS 32,000 (~ $3200). Furthermore, although job experience can be constructed back to 1972, no information on educational attainment is available for those starting their professional career before that time. For other persons, years of schooling had to be approximated by the year of entry in the labor force; this gives the maximum possible number of years. Observations of persons with a monthly income below $300 were eliminated.
Firm size is coded into 27 categories, these categories have been transformed into a continuous scale by using category means. Moreover, for a subsample of individuals (N=5570) exact firm size is available together with additional information concerning the firm, e.g. age of the firm and the structure of employment. Results using this smaller sample will be presented below.
For the definition of a layoff I observe the period June 1991 -May 1992. A layoff is coded if the person falls unemployed in this period without an intervening new employment spell (12.3%). 5.5% of these unemployed can be identified as job quitters, because job quitters may not collect benefits during their first month of unemployment. Removing these job quitters we now arrive at a mean layoff probability in the sample of 11.6%. This definition of redundancy can be criticized because those laid off but didn't fall unemployed are not considered. 7 No distinction between temporary or permanent layoff is made.
Results
As already said, monthly earnings are only reported up to the social security contribution ceiling W c , 10% of the data thus are 'right-censored'. The impact of firm size S i on log monthly earnings lnW i can be written as a tobit specification: earnings. X i 1 is a vector of further explanatory variables, stemming mainly from human capital theory, α α and 1 are parameters to be estimated and ε 1i is an error term with E(ε 1i )=0. Similarly, the probability of layoff (L i ) during the next year can be formulated as a probit model if ε 2i is assumed to be normally distributed.
The distinction between quit and layoff is especially tricky, so that some studies of job turnover simply refrain from it (e.g. Anderson and Meyer, 1994 ).
Summary statistics of the explanatory variables together with results for the earnings and layoff equations are presented in Table 1 . Earnings react strongly to firm size. An employee working at a location with ln (firm size) one standard deviation above average can be expected to earn about 13% more than a similar worker at a location with ln (firm size) one standard deviation below average. 8 This is almost exactly the same size-wage differential as Brown and Medoff (1989) reported for the US. Likewise, a strong size effect can be observed for layoff risk. The mean layoff risk in the sample is 11.6%. Again, a person working with a firm one standard deviation above the mean firm size compared to a similar employee in a firm one standard deviation below the mean firm size experiences a 5.1 percentage points lower layoff risk. The results are comparable to those obtained by Idson (1995) for the US. This close similarity to results for the US is astonishing, especially because Hartog and Teulings (forthcoming) claim that corporatist economies have lower wage differentials according to different criteria, like tenure, industries, but also by firm size. One explanation could be the prevalence of very small firms in Austria. Among the big firms in the sample, there could also be some nationalized firms, which paid traditionally higher wages. Unfortunately, the owner structure of the firms is not observed.
The other explanatory variables conform to prior expectations. As variables like tenure and work experience relate only to the period 1972-1991, I included age as an additional regressor to control for pre-1972 experience. Formal education and apprenticeship training increase earnings significantly as does general work experience. Interestingly, the effect of job tenure is not well determined. Foreigners and blue-collar workers receive considerably lower wages. The same is true for workers in small cities and those (almost all) who are not living near the Swiss border. This east-west trend in Austrian wages exists because of better income prospects in Switzerland.
The most influential determinants in the layoff equation are job tenure and social status. White-collar workers face a displacement risk of only 7.1% compared to 14.4% for blue-collar workers. Increasing tenure with the firm from 1 to 5 years reduces layoff risk from 23.5 to 10.1%. No significant impact of formal education and citizenship could be detected. This may in part be caused by measurement problems in the schooling variable. There is some evidence that elderly people face higher layoff risks than younger ones which runs counter to usual job-matching arguments, but also the aforementioned job protection legislation. This can be explained by a coincidence of steep and inflexible ageearnings profiles and specific aspects of the Austrian social security system. 9 As far as the health indicator -the percentage of illness days per day of work experience -can be taken as a measure of absenteeism, employers react with a higher threat of layoff. If larger firms invest a greater amount in on-the-job training, then they would be less likely to want to keep elderly workers -given tenure and training received -because of a shorter expected period over which to recover their investments 10 (Bartel and Sicherman, 1993) . Likewise, larger employers might punish absenteeism due to illness more severely if they rely more heavily on team production (Kremer, 1993 , Idson, 1995a . To test these theories I performed separate regressions for big (above average) and small firms. The positive effect of age on layoff risk is found to be significantly higher in larger firms, whereas no such distinctions have been found for the health variable.
In Tables 2 and 3 several hypotheses which have been advanced to explain the size-layoff puzzle are discussed: on-the-job training, compensation schemes and heterogeneity of workers. In Table 2 the basic framework for the layoff equation is retained and only further explanatory variables are added. Table 3 presents results for various subgroups. Idson (1995) argues that "large firms are intrinsically better able to develop long-term relationships with their employees due to a lower failure probability and a greater capacity to provide career growth and alternative types of jobs within the organization, and that employer size patterns in remuneration, on-the-job training, and the types of employees hired ultimately follow from these root causes" (p. 5).
Unfortunately, no information on internal mobility and expected failure rates is available in the Austrian data set at hand. Using four different data sets for the US, Idson (1995) finds no unambiguous evidence concerning internal mobility and failure rates; in particular the size-layoff relationship remains more or less stable. An indirect way to test for the importance of on-the-job-training -without actually observing it -is to rely on information implicitly contained in job tenure. Insofar as job tenure proxies greater training levels and training opportunities are better in larger firms, results without controlling for job tenure should yield a higher size-layoff relationship. This is in fact the case as shown in Table 2 (Row 1). Interaction terms of ln (firm size) with tenure reveal that no firm-size effects prevail for employees working with their firm for less than one year (Table 3 , Item 1). This indirect effect of the prevalence of on-the-job training can only be a partial explanation for the size-layoff puzzle: firstly, the size-layoff relationship is not linear with tenure; after three years of tenure the effect stays constant or even declines again. Secondly, we might think of other labor market groups who are supposed to have low on-the-job training: women and blue-collar workers. All subgroups have a significant size effect. The effect for blue-collars is smaller than for white-collars, but the difference is not significant. Furthermore, women's layoff risk reacts even stronger to firm size than men's. 11
In Table 3 , Columns 2 and 3, further restrictions are relaxed. Looking separately at blue-collar and white-collar workers we find an interesting pattern which can be easily reconciled with on-the-job training. For blue-collar workers upgrading of skills occurs only in the first two years, after that time the size-layoff relationship stays constant. On the other hand, white-collar workers already start with a considerable size-layoff coefficient which is steadily increasing with tenure. This observation -if one is willing to interpret it in terms of on-the-job training -would imply a continuous process of on-the-job training for whitecollars but only a short period of accumulation of firm-specific human capital for blue-collars.
High levels of on-the-job training may lead employers to pay higher wages to inhibit costly monitoring. Moreover, if monitoring workers is more difficult in larger firms (Garen, 1985) , employers may rely, to a greater extent, on wage premia to raise the cost to the worker of being dismissed in case of shirking or misbehavior. To the extent that large employers substitute higher efficiency wages for lower detection rates, high wage premia should lead to lower layoff rates. These monitoring models are notoriously difficult to test, because in principle effective dismissal threats will do their job to motivate workers without causing any real layoffs. 12 Although wage premia are no reliable test for either on-the-job-training nor for monitoring effects, they might be an independent factor accounting for turnover differentials. resulting wage effect gives the influence of wage premiums. Although both earnings variables are negative and highly significant, the size-layoff relationship diminishes only by 5%.
A further explanation for the observed size-layoff puzzle may be heterogeneity of workers. Large firms employ different workers than small ones. Workers who are seeking good training opportunities, who are risk averse and are less willing to change jobs frequently may prefer employment at a large firm. On the other hand, large firms may actively search for stable workers, because otherwise investment into sophisticated capital equipment and firm-specific training will be less useful. Because of the more complex internal organization of the firm and problems of monitoring, big employers may also be willing to screen applicants more intensively to find out the most able candidates (Barron, et al. 1985 ).
An obvious 13 proxy for workers' stability is prior inter-firm mobility. The variable "number of previous jobs since 1972" raises layoff risk considerably, but apart from that, the size-layoff relationship stays almost constant (Table 2 , Row 3). Looking at Table 3 , Item 4 we see that, in fact, large firms reward stable workers more. The size-layoff coefficient is -0.103 for employees with less than three previous jobs, but only -0.038 (still significant) for those with more than ten job changes. 14 Intrinsically stable workers can "buy" more job stability by joining big employers.
Further experiments included the inclusion of more industry-specific variables in the layoff equation, as well as the addition of 18 industry dummies. The sizelayoff coefficient was only slightly reduced. Furthermore, no clear picture emerged when firm size was interacted with industry dummies.
For a subsample of observations (N=5570), more information on firms was available. Of principal interest is the influence of firm age. As the firm becomes better organized over time, training opportunities might emerge, and the internal labor market may also take time to evolve. The results in Table 3 , Item 5 confirm this view. For newly-founded firms (age < 3 years) no size effect is existent, for those of age 3 to 6 years the effect is only significant at the 5% level. 15 On the other extreme, the stability advantage of firm size in older firms is considerable.
To sum up, there is a considerable size-layoff relationship in Austria which can be compared in size to that in the US There is no unanimously convincing rationale for it, but there are indications that on-the-job training and heterogeneity of workers is important. Furthermore, this empirical regularity does not show up for very young firms.
Layoff risk and firm-size wage premiums
As was argued in the last Section, small and large firms may employ very different types of workers. If large firms offer more long-term employment relationships with more on-the-job training, inter-firm mobility and prospects for professional advancement within the firm, then a very specific workforce will be recruited. If small firms have higher failure rates and higher employment variability (Dunne et al., 1989) two consequences might emerge. Firstly, workers have to be compensated by higher wages for higher employment risk. This would call for higher wages in small firms. If, on the other hand, less stable workers find employment at more unstable small firms, the necessary wage premium can be reduced because these jobs are more attractive for this kind of workers. To the extent that less stability correlates with lower ability, the wage premium may even be reversed: unstable and therefore small-firm workers may have lower wages in equilibrium (Evans and Leighton, 1989, p. 309) . If employment risk correlates negatively with firm size and if risk exerts a negative independent effect on wages, then the estimated firm-size wage relationship will be upward biased due to omitted variable bias.
Mayo and Murray (1991) present a test of this theory using aggregate firm data for Tennessee. They estimate an exit probability for firms and include this imputed exit probability as a further regressor in a (firm mean) wage equation. Doing this, the size-wage premium disappears completely. As Mayo and Murray (1991) have only a limited set of firm-specific variables at their disposal -exit rates are driven by firm age, size and industry dummies alone -I present a complementary approach using individual data. 16 Instead of using the probability of failure of the firm, I use the individual probability to be dismissed as the employment stability indicator. Given the above discussion on the impact of compensation schemes on layoff probabilities, the earnings variable should be including in the layoff equation. This results in a simultaneous system of two equations.
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. As equation (3) has the information structure of a tobit and equation (4) that of a probit model, the simultaneous system can be solved in a two-stage procedure analogous to the system proposed by Nelson and Olson (1978) . 17 This involves the estimation of the reduced forms for L into equations (3) and (4). Thereby, asymptotically consistent estimators for the structural coefficients are produced by using single equation estimation in the second stage. 18 The system is identified by zero restrictions in each equation. Whereas the regional variables (east, mid, west), which are important for the regional wage profile, are excluded from the layoff equation, the latter includes the number of previous jobs, the illness ratio (number of days ill per work experience in the last three years) as an indicator for health and the failure risk of firms on a county basis (91 counties). 19 The latter variable should especially model different firm survival prospects.
Results of the structural earnings equations are presented in Table 4 for the full sample and for a restricted sample where more firm indicators were available. 20 The predicted layoff probability has the expected negative influence on earnings and is highly significant. Due to this correction the size-wage gap drops by 40%, but is still significantly different from zero. The inclusion of employment risk seems to corroborate the hypothesis of sorting by stable and unstable employees. Nonetheless, a considerable size-wage differential remains, which is in contrast to results by Mayo and Murray (1991) who are using firm data alone. In Column 2 the findings are similar. From the included firm-specific variables only firm age turned out positive and significant. 21 20 See Winter-Ebmer (1995) for a preliminary analysis. 21 For more evidence on firm age and wages see Brown and Medoff (1995) .
Conclusions
This paper makes a first step into the understanding of employer size-wage differentials as well as employment stability in large and small firms. Like the widely documented positive firm-size wage relationship, there also exists a negative relationship between firm size and layoff risk. This amplifies the empirical puzzle still further: large firms pay more and also offer more stable employment conditions. The reasons for this differential are not completely clear, but some evidence for the importance of on-the-job training and heterogeneity of workers has been found. There is certainly a need to look further at this issue, in particular when more comprehensive data sets are available, covering simultaneously working conditions, on-the-job training and inter-firm mobility of workers.
Employment stability in the firm can also be taken as a selection device, sorting intrinsically stable and unstable workers. Workers who are subject to greater layoff risk receive lower wages. This is a consequence of the selection process whereby workers with low (unobservable) human capital sort themselves into smaller, more unstable firms. Including individual employment risk in an earnings equation thus reduces the size-earnings relationship considerably, because the heterogeneity of workers is taken into account. All equations contain 7 region-specific dummies for regional types obtained by the Austrian Raumordnungskonferenz. Standard errors in parentheses, *** significance level 1%.
2)
Indicates that person entered the labor market before 1972.
3)
Days ill per day of job experience. 2) Based on a subsample of individuals (N=5570), where more firm information was available, also 6 additional firm variables are included.
*** (**,*) significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
1) Both equations contain 7 region-specific dummies. ***(**,*) significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. 2) Observations with missing regional affiliation were deleted.
